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1. Introduction
What determines a firm’s financial market value is
valuable information for economic actors like share-
holders, investors, and managers whose rewards are
directly linked to the firm’s stock market performance.
In mature product markets, in which demand and
product standards are consolidated, a firm’s finan-
cial market value should be influenced less by exoge-
nous factors (demand shocks, technology paradigm
shifts, industry shake-outs, etc.) and more by manage-
rial actions (Andrews and Smith 1996).
In addition, in mature product markets, because
of the small number of well-established competitors,
actions of rival firms become relatively more impor-
tant for the understanding of a firm’s financial mar-
ket value. In fact, rival actions are more visible, and
their effects are both more sizable and easier to single
out. The empirical literature on this topic is, however,
rather underdeveloped. A recent paper by McGahan
and Silverman (2006) focuses on the effect of patents
granted to competitors. Other scholars have looked at
competitors’ radical product innovations (Aboulnasr
et al. 2008), alliances (Das et al. 1998), and price
changes (Chen and MacMillan 1992). To the best of
our knowledge, little research has been conducted on
the effect of rival moves along non-price dimensions
of the marketing mix—typically relevant in many
mature product categories—on a firm’s financial mar-
ket value.
Our paper fills this lacuna. Specifically, we investi-
gate how rival moves in product innovation and new
advertising affect a firm’s stock market performance
in a mature product market beyond own firm moves.
A priori, the expected effect is not clear-cut, because
some rival actions could increase a firm’s financial
market value while others might dampen it (Bayus
and Putsis 1999, Kadiyali et al. 1999). We argue that
a good strategy to dissolve this ambiguity is to dis-
entangle those rival actions that redistribute market
shares (market share dynamics) from those that alter
total demand (market size dynamics).
Empirically, we investigate our surmises in the
carbonated soft drink (CSD) industry from January
1999 to December 2003, a $66 billion industry in
the United States alone in 2005 (Yoffie 2007). The
choice of this market makes a natural experiment
possible: During the sample period, the CSD mar-
ket was virtually a mature duopoly (Coca-Cola and
Pepsi controlled more than 75% of total sales) char-
acterized by relative price stability, little growth in
demand, and the absence of exogenous shocks (Dubé
2004). The duopoly condition allows us to investigate
with greater precision the effects of strategic actions
and reactions on the two competitors’ financial mar-
ket value. Moreover, because in the CSD industry
prices are not major tools of competition, we are
able to isolate more effectively the impact of product
innovation and new advertising.1 It is worth noting
that Coca-Cola and Pepsi together invest more than
1 Coca-Cola and Pepsi make most of their profits by selling con-
centrate to independent bottlers. Interesting enough, during the
period under study, CSD retail prices have remained stable, while
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$3 billion each year in new product development and
advertising.
Our empirical results show that rival product inno-
vation has a negative impact on a firm’s financial mar-
ket value, while rival new advertising has a positive
effect. These two strategic actions affect financial mar-
ket value through different channels. While rival new
advertising affects the firm’s financial market value
through total demand (market size dynamics), rival
product innovation acts directly on the distribution of
market shares (market share dynamics).
The paper makes the following contributions to
the literature. First, we enrich the evidence on the
impacts of marketing actions on a firm’s financial
market value, which is somewhat less extensive than
that focused on other competitive moves, such as
alliances or research and development (R&D) invest-
ments. Most of the existing research is focused on
measuring how a change in advertising expendi-
tures affects stock prices (e.g., Erickson and Jacobson
1992, Cheng and Chen 1997). Some notable exceptions
are Rao et al. (2004), who analyze the relationship
between branding strategy and the intangible value of
a corporation; Mizik and Jacobson (2003), who focus
on the financial market impact of shifts in strategic
emphasis; Lane and Jacobson (1995), who explore the
role of brand attitude and familiarity on the stock
market reactions to brand extension announcements;
and Pauwels et al. (2004) and Srinivasan et al. (2009),
who investigate the relationship between sales pro-
motions, product innovation, and firm value in the
automobile industry.
Most notably, our paper constitutes one of the few
studies that highlight the impact of rival marketing
moves on a firm’s financial market value (for product
announcements, see Chen et al. 2005). Theoretically,
product innovation and new advertising can work
as either defensive or offensive strategic tools (Bayus
and Putsis 1999, Kadiyali et al. 1999, Shaffer and
Zhang 2002). Our evidence suggests that in the case
of Coca-Cola and Pepsi, the defensive nonthreaten-
ing effect prevails for new advertising, the aggressive
effect dominates for product innovation. Although
this finding might be specific to the CSD market, the
idea that new advertising is less aggressive than prod-
uct innovation can be a more general insight.
Our contribution in terms of measurement is also
worth mentioning. We use trademarks filed at the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) as a proxy for
new advertising. Trademarks, similarly to patents—
a commonly employed measure of innovation—are
intellectual property rights. Differently from patents,
concentrate prices have slightly increased (Yoffie 2007). In fact,
prices of concentrate are negotiated through long-term contracts
and remain mostly fixed for a long while.
however, trademarks are not granted “on the basis
of nonobviousness, inventiveness in the face of prior
art and the potential for industrial application”
(Mendonca et al. 2004, p. 1387). Whereas patents are
used to protect innovation, trademarks are filed to
secure legal protection of brand names, recognizable
designations, and symbols for goods and services, as
well as firms’ identities. Trademarks can be conceived
as one of the possible outcomes of a firm’s adver-
tising activity.2 From an empirical viewpoint, trade-
marks combine high time frequency with a reliable
good and service description, so that it is possible
to measure the precise advertising output in a given
product category. Compared to standard accounting
measures, this allows a better match with the pro-
motion process, which is characterized by pulsing,
i.e., firms systematically switch promotion on and off
at a high frequency (Ofek and Sarvary 2003). More-
over, even if correlated with advertising expenditures,
trademarks constitute an output measure that is more
likely to affect directly a firm’s financial market value,
compared to input variables. For example, Seetham-
raju (2003) uses trademarks as a proxy for a firm’s
intangible marketing assets.
The next section lays down the theoretical back-
ground and defines our hypotheses. Section 3 briefly
describes the CSD market; §4 presents the data and
our empirical methods, shows the results, and dis-
cusses several robustness checks. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2. Theoretical Background and
Hypotheses
In mature product markets, where design standards
are well established, competition is more functional
and strategic, and typically revolves around improve-
ment of the existing products and processes and
on enhanced marketing activity (Chandler 1994).
A growing stream of the literature has attempted to
analyze the impact of product innovation and new
advertising on firm financial market value (Bayus
et al. 2003, Rao et al. 2004, Srinivasan et al. 2009).3
There are several intertwined forces at play, which
2 Mendonca et al. (2004) suggest that trademarks can be used as
an indicator of innovation activity. Instead, we believe that trade-
marks serve better as an indicator of advertising activity for sev-
eral reasons. First, a trademark can be legally granted without an
underlying innovation. Second, even when it is associated with a
new product or service, a trademark constitutes the outcome of a
marketing effort aimed at increasing the protection of the innova-
tion. Finally, as suggested by interviews with marketing executives
at Pepsi and Coca-Cola, most trademarks are not associated with
new products or services, but with new advertising campaigns. For
a similar interpretation, see Seethamraju (2003).
3 Product innovations modify observable characteristics, such as
size, shape, color, weight, design, material, reliability, and taste,
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increase the complexity of the analysis. Both prod-
uct innovation and new advertising are likely to
positively affect the financial market value of the
firm by triggering business stealing from competi-
tors (Kekre and Srinivasan 1990) and/or expanding
demand by either stimulating purchase acceleration
(Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001) or attracting new
customers (Lancaster 1984). On the other hand, some
authors have argued that these positive effects must
be weighted against the risk of jeopardizing existing
income streams (Conner 1998). Most of the empir-
ical works have, however, found a positive impact
of a firm’s actions along these two dimensions on
its financial market value. Surprisingly enough, the
impact of rivals’ product innovation and new adver-
tising on a firm’s financial market value has received
disproportionately less attention, if any.4 Thus our
theoretical argument below will focus on the effect of
rivals’ actions only. This choice is not meant to deny
the importance of our actions, but simply to sharpen
the exposition and preserve conciseness.
To structure the discussion, let vit be the finan-
cial market value of firm i at time t; that is, the net
present value of its future stream of profits. Mahajan
et al. (1993) and Nguyen and Shi (2006), among oth-
ers, argue that the relationship between vit and rivals’
actions depends on the interaction of two effects: mar-
ket substitution (market share dynamics) and market
expansion (market size dynamics). Other things being
equal, financial market value is likely to increase if
the firm attains a larger market share and/or if total
demand expands. In the following arguments, the
effects of rival product innovation and new advertis-
ing on a firm’s financial market value are channeled
through these two different avenues.
In formulating our hypotheses, we do not exam-
ine other marketing actions like price and price pro-
motions that might affect a rival’s financial market
value. To empirically control for this additional source
of heterogeneity, we focus on a specific context in
which price and price promotions are barely used by
competitors. Thus, pricing can safely remain in the
background.
2.1. Product Innovation
Because of well-established product standards, prod-
uct innovations in mature product industries tend
to be incremental or marginal. We analyze here the
which are relevant to customers’ preferences and condition their
choices. Advertising is built on a complex constellation of psy-
chological attributes that the consumer assigns to purchasing,
owning, and consuming a particular product. To a great extent,
advertising creates brand power that influences and reinforces
customer perceptual connections among products, identity, and
lifestyle (Upshaw 1995).
4 A notable exception is Chen et al. (2005).
impact of a rival’s efforts to expand, modify, and
deepen its product offerings on firm i’s financial mar-
ket value. First, consider firm i’s market share. In
almost any model of product differentiation, a larger
number of varieties produced by a rival reduces com-
petitors’ market shares (e.g., Champsaur and Rochet
1989, Kekre and Srinivasan 1990). In fact, as long as
some customers are substituting firm i’s products for
rival new offerings, then the impact of a rival’s move
on a firm’s market share is negative.
Concerning market size dynamics, first, by expand-
ing its set of product features, a firm can induce
greater demand among existing customers. Second,
and more important, by adding new product vari-
eties, a firm can attract customers who try the prod-
uct for the first time. New customers usually exhibit
little brand loyalty and may later spread across dif-
ferent brands, the so-called churn demand (Neslin
et al. 2006). This implies that a firm’s new product
introductions could increase industry demand, with
some of this increment spilling over to its rivals.
For instance, Mahajan et al. (1993) have shown that
the introduction of the instant cameras by Kodak
expanded the market by 37%, benefiting also its rival,
Panasonic.
In mature product markets, it is less likely that
product innovations will end up attracting new and
inexperienced consumers who might first try a prod-
uct and later reallocate their demand toward com-
peting brands. This follows the current view in the
literature: It is radical, not marginal or incremental,
product innovation that significantly influences mar-
ket size dynamics (e.g., Aboulnasr et al. 2008). Sim-
ilarly, Mahajan et al. (1993) argue that the market
expansion effect of a new product introduction is
more likely to happen early in the process of market
evolution.
In sum, product innovation by a rival is likely
to decrease a firm’s market share, thus reducing
its financial market value, other things being equal
(price, costs, etc.). In mature product markets, this
negative effect is unlikely to be counterbalanced by
an increment in total demand.
Hypothesis 1. In mature product markets, the net
effect of rival product innovation on a firm’s financial mar-
ket value is negative.
2.2. New Advertising
Rival new advertising might also affect both firm i’s
market share and total demand. The literature classi-
fies advertising in two categories: generic and brand
advertising (Bass et al. 2005), which affect market size
and market share dynamics differently.
Generic advertising boosts primary demand by
attracting new consumers (Berndt et al. 1997), in-
creasing per capita consumption of the product,
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and lengthening the product life cycle (Friedman
and Friedman 1976, Krishnamurthy 2000). Lancaster
(1984) claims that market size dynamic is the most
common effect of advertising. Greater demand bene-
fits all incumbent firms, thus rival generic new adver-
tising is likely to increase a firm’s financial market
value.
Rival brand advertising directly influences firm i’s
market share. In fact, brand advertising can increase
the probability that a customer will change his or
her purchase decision. It provides consumers with
information about the brand’s value proposition that
differentiates it from its competitors, thereby encour-
aging consumers of other brands to move to the
advertised product (Krishnamurthy 2001). However,
in mature product markets, the product design is
well established and consumers tend to be well
informed and sophisticated. Information channeled
through advertising is less relevant, and brand loy-
alty is consolidated and more difficult to circumvent.
For instance, Parsons (1975) and Tellis and Fornell
(1988), among others, report that consumer response
to brand advertising is lower in later stages of the
product life cycle.
Because brand identity is well established in
mature product markets, brand advertising can also
increase the perceived differentiation among com-
peting brands (Lancaster 1984). The more differen-
tiated the brands are in the eyes of the consumers,
the greater the brand loyalty and the more inelas-
tic demand will be. Thus all firms might benefit of
increased market power as a consequence of brand
advertising.
Finally, in mature product markets, advertising can
be used to endogenously increase barriers to entry
(Sutton 1998). Thus, a rival’s advertising might sig-
nal an attempt to make entry by potential competitors
much more difficult and expensive. To compete on
equal foot, new entrants must undertake similar sunk
investments in advertising, which, given their initial
small scale, would push their average cost well above
that of existing firms. All incumbents would benefit
if barriers to entry an industry are raised.
These arguments lead to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. In mature product markets, the net
effect of rival new advertising on a firm’s financial market
value is positive.
3. Market Background: CSD Industry
A CDS consists of a flavor base, a sweetener, and
carbonated water. The production and distribution
of CSDs involve four major participant groups: sup-
pliers of inputs, concentrate producers, bottlers, and
retail channels. A concentrate producer blends a few
raw materials that, for most regular colas, consist
of caramel coloring, phosphoric or citric acid, natu-
ral flavors, and caffeine. Such inputs are produced
at competitive prices. Bottlers purchase concentrate,
add carbonated water and high fructose corn syrup,
bottle or can the CSD, and deliver it to customer
accounts. The CSD industry grew in the United States
at approximately 3% per year over the period 1970–
2000 with demand flattening over the last years.
Among concentrate producers, Coca-Cola and
Pepsi controlled 75.6% and 75.8% of the U.S. CSD
market in sales volume in 1999 and 2003, respectively.
Cadbury Schwepps (approximately 14%) and private
labels (approximately 10%) accounted for the remain-
ing share of the U.S. CSD market. Coca-Cola was for-
mulated in 1886, and Pepsi-Cola in 1893. Coca-Cola
was the uncontested leader in the early history of the
CSD market, with a 50% market share in 1950. Dur-
ing the 1960s, Coca-Cola and Pepsi began to experi-
ment with new cola and noncola flavors and a variety
of packaging options, abandoning their traditional
single-product strategy.
Although Coca-Cola and Pepsi have aggressively
competed for market share, they have often avoided
direct price competition (pretax profits of the order
of 30% in the late 1990s). Thus, announcements of
increases in concentrate price by one company are
often followed immediately by upward adjustments
by the rival. For instance, both firms raised concen-
trate prices throughout the 1980s and early 1990s,
even if the real (inflation-adjusted) retail prices for
CSD decreased. According to Roger Enrico, former
CEO of Pepsi-Cola, “the warfare must be perceived
as a continuing battle without blood     If the Coca-
Cola company didn’t exist, we’d pray for someone
to invent them” (Yoffie 2007, p. 1). The price of con-
centrate is negotiated with the bottlers through long-
term agreements. The bottlers, who have exclusive
territories, take care of distributing cans and bottles
to the retailers, except in the case of fountain outlets
(McDonald, Subway, etc.).
The two firms are instead aggressively compet-
ing on nonprice dimensions of the marketing mix,
i.e., product innovation and advertising. In the CSD
industry, new product introduction refers to a change
in the physical characteristics of the product: flavors,
ingredients, colors, packaging, etc.—all marginal or
incremental innovations. The importance of adver-
tising is documented by the important investment
in branding and trademarks over time, usually with
innovative and sophisticated advertising campaigns.
Coca-Cola filed for its first trademark in 1927 and at
the end of 2004 had been granted 1,105 trademarks.
Pepsi registered its first trademark in 1907 and at
the end of 2004 had filed 1,402 trademarks. In the
year 2000, Coca-Cola spent more than $200 million
advertising its flagship brand, “Coke Classic” (Yoffie
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2007). From the annual reports, Coca-Cola advertis-
ing expenditures topped $1.8 billion in 2002 and $1.9
billion in 2003. Pepsi shows similar amounts ($1.6 bil-
lion and $1.5 billion). By contrast, private labels do
not play this game.
4. Data and Empirical Analysis
4.1. Variables of Theoretical Interest
The two variables of theoretical interest are product
innovation and new advertising. We measure these
two variables with the announcements of new prod-
uct introductions and with trademarks filed at the
USPTO, respectively. The market for soft drinks can
be divided into two main niches; namely, carbonated
soft drinks (Coke, Pepsi, Sprite, Fanta, Mountain Dew,
etc.) and noncarbonated soft drinks (juices, milky and
energy drinks, tea, coffee, water, etc.). Coca-Cola and
Pepsi operate in both niches. But because up until
2003, CSDs still accounted for substantially more than
50% of both firms’ total sales (close to 80% for Coca-
Cola), we focus on the CSD niche, where the two
companies maintained a stable duopoly. We, however,
control for their activity outside CSD.
Product introduction data come from Infotrac’s
Promt database, which, from a large set of trade jour-
nals, magazines, and other specialized publications,
reports several categories of events like product intro-
ductions classified by SIC codes all around the world
(although a U.S. bias might exist in the database).
This database is the new version of the old Predicast
database, which has been used extensively in the lit-
erature (e.g., Pennings and Harianto 1992). We search
for all press articles that are classified as a “product
announcement,” a “new product release,” or a “prod-
uct introduction” for Coca-Cola or Pepsi between
January 1999 and December 2003. Then, from each of
these articles, we extract the date of product introduc-
tion, and we use the text and the precise SIC code of
the article to select only those products introduced in
the CSD niche.5 By and large, product announcements
can be assigned to two categories: (1) new products
(e.g., Cherry Mountain Dew, Lime Diet Coke, etc.) and
(2) new packages, cans, or bottles of existing products
(e.g., limited edition, silver-colored, plastic, 2-liter bot-
tle, etc.). Our 79.4% of product introductions belong
to this second category.
Trademarks are combinations of words, phrases,
symbols, or designs that identify and distinguish the
source of the goods or services of one party from
those of others (http://www.uspto.gov). Firms can
register as a trademark a new name, jingle, slogan,
5 Precisely, we excluded tropical/milky and other types of juices,
tea/coffee infusions, water, energetic/vitamin/sport drinks, and
yogurts.
new image, or logo (“can’t leave home without it”).6
Trademarks are employed to legally protect brand
names, recognizable designations and symbols for
goods and services, as well as firms’ identities. Trade-
marks aim to place a connection in the mind of the
consumer between a product or service and its level
of quality (Seethamraju 2003). Interviews with exec-
utives at Coca-Cola and Pepsi have suggested that
trademarks are also a crucial step in new advertising
campaigns. For example, October 25, 2004, Coca-Cola
filed for the trademark make it real, which the USPTO
granted with the number 78,505,276. Randy Ran-
som, senior vice-president for marketing at Coca-Cola
North America, commented: “The new campaign,
called make it real, attempts to take the two-year-
old [  ] ‘Coca-Cola Real’ campaign to a new level.”
Many industry observers applauded the Real cam-
paign for making strides in connecting with younger
consumers (Wall Street Journal 2005, p. 14). The above
reasons in addition to the higher frequency data avail-
ability make trademarks a valuable indicator of new
advertising output.
We do not have information about trademarks reg-
istered outside the United States, which, given the
importance of international markets for Coca-Cola
and Pepsi, constitutes a limitation of the present work.
It is true, however, that for most international adver-
tising initiatives, both companies start their protection
strategy at the USPTO.
We download all trademarks whose owner is Coca-
Cola or Pepsi with filing dates between January
1999 and December 2003. Looking at the goods or
services description, we select only the CSD-related
trademarks.
It is worth noting that the two firms customarily
concentrate trademarks filing in different periods of
the year: Coca-Cola during the Christmas holidays
and Pepsi during the summer holidays. Indeed, the
correlation between the time series of Coca-Cola and
Pepsi trademarks is only 0.126, not significant at the
10% level. Note also the large standard deviation of
the trademarks variable (shown in Table 2). It is dif-
ficult to observe this rich variation from accounting
data alone. In fact, in the period 1999–2003, the two
firms show an average growth rate of advertising
expenses of only 1.1%, with a standard deviation of
0.8%. These figures suggest that (1) it is less likely
that the number of trademarks is demand driven,
thus attenuating potential endogeneity concerns and
6 U.S. trademark owners pay different types of fees for each class
of goods or services for which a trademark is registered, and they
have to prove periodically that they are using the trademark in the
U.S. market. The front page of the trademark file provides useful
information—e.g., the owner’s name and address, the date when a
complete application was received by the USPTO (filing date), and
the goods or services description.
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(2) trademarks allow for a more fine-grained analysis
than advertising expenditures do.
In what follows, we first quantify empirically the
impact of rival product announcements and filed
trademarks on a firm’s financial market value using
both an event study approach and a Tobin’s q regres-
sion, and then we explore more deeply the channels
through which these marketing actions affect a firm’s
financial market value, i.e., market size and market
share dynamics.
4.2. An Event Study Regression
We follow the model of Austin (1993), which is specif-
ically suited for patent data and similar intangible
assets. That is, we employ the capital asset pricing
model in which the returns to firm equity in excess
of the risk-free return are explained by returns to
a value-weighted market index (net of the risk-free
rate). We also control for the variables suggested by
Fama and French (1992) to allow risk to depend not
only on beta but also on size and “book-to-market”
factors. We estimate a daily regression for the sample
period (January 1999–December 2003). The “excess
return” on a firm’s equity is defined as the por-
tion of the firm’s n-day “event window” returns not
explained by this model (i.e., the residual).
The modified model reads as follows:
rit − rft	 = 
+1rmktt − rft	+2SMBt
+3HMLt +Dt + it (1)
where rit is the return on shares of firm i over the
time t window. Data are from Yahoo!Financial. From
the actualized data set of Fama and French (1992)7
we compute: rft , the risk-free rate of return at time t;
rmktt , the return on all firms in NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ at time t; SMBt , the Fama and French’s
(1992) index of small versus big capitalization at
time t; HMLt , the Fama and French’s (1992) index of
high versus low book/price ratio at time t.
Dt is a dummy variable equal to one if event 
occurs at time t. We have two main events: Dpro-
ductrival (the rival has released a new product) and
Dtrademarkrival (the rival has filed a new trade-
mark). We also add as controls Dproductfirm (the
firm has released a new product), Dtrademarkfirm
(the firm has filed a new trademark), and a firm
dummy (Firm, zero for Coca-Cola, one for Pepsi).

 is the constant and it the random error term. To
eliminate noise and potential omitted variable bias,
only product announcements and trademarks that
did not coincide with other events (e.g., earnings
announcements, changing relationships with bottlers
7 Available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.
french/ftp/F-F_Research_Data_Factors_daily.zip.
Table 1a Robust OLS Estimation of Equation (1)
Window of days
Variable Mean Std. dev. −5 +5 −3 +3 −1 +1 0
Dependent variable
rit − r ft −0013 0020
Fama and French (1992) controls
rmktt − r ft −0015 1344 0005∗∗ 0003∗∗ 0004∗∗ 0006∗∗
0000	 0000	 0000	 0000	
SMBt 0038 0731 0007∗∗ 0004∗∗ 0003∗∗ 0004∗∗
0001	 0001	 0001	 0000	
HMLt 0022 0830 −0004∗∗ −0004∗∗ −0005∗∗ −0005∗∗
0001	 0001	 0001	 0001	
Firm 0500 0500 0009∗∗ 0004∗ 0001 0002
0001	 0002	 0001	 0003	

 −0021∗∗ −0019∗∗ −0014∗∗ −0013∗∗
0000	 0001	 0001	 0002	
Dummy event
Dproductrival 0041 0199 −0006∗ −0005∗∗ −0005∗∗ −0008∗∗
0004	 0002	 0002	 0001	
Dtrademarkrival 0023 0150 0004 0004 0004∗ 0005∗∗
0004	 0003	 0002	 0001	
Dproductfirm 0041 0199 0008 0007∗ 0007∗∗ 0010∗∗
0006	 0004	 0003	 0002	
Dtrademarkfirm 0023 0150 0006 0006 0007∗∗ 0007∗∗
0005	 0005	 0004	 0003	
Observations 2,816 2,816 2,816 2,816
R2 0093 0092 0102 0114
Adj. R2 0091 0091 0099 0101
Notes. Robust Huber-White estimator of variance. Event day regression in
the sample period 1999–2003.
∗0.1 significance; ∗∗0.05 significance.
Table 1b U.S. Dollar Changes (in Millions) in Firm Market
Capitalization According to an Event (Average Values of
Share Outstanding and Share Price 1999–2003)
Coca-Cola+
Event Coca-Cola Pepsi Pepsi
Coca-Cola announces a new product (1) 9084 −3528 5556
Pepsi announces a new product (2) −6489 4939 −1549
Product introduction (1+ 2) 2595 1411
Coca-Cola files a trademark (3) 8825 2823 11647
Pepsi files a trademark (4) 4798 5191 9989
Trademark introduction 3+ 4	 13623 8013
and fountain accounts, corporate initiatives, etc.) were
included in the data set. For trademarks, we use
the date in which they are filed at the USPTO. This
is when information is revealed to the market and
legal protection becomes enforceable if the trademark
is subsequently granted. In fact, using grating dates
does not produce statistically significant coefficients.
Table 1a shows the basic statistics and the results
of the ordinary least squares (OLS) robust regres-
sion of (1) for different event windows (11 days,
7 days, 3 days, and same day). Coefficients for the
dummy events are daily excess returns because of
the corresponding event. Interesting enough, they
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become statistically insignificant as we enlarge the
event window, suggesting that the effect of the event
concentrates mostly in the event day, without signifi-
cant anticipation, or delays in market reaction.
Results for the smaller event windows support our
hypotheses: The introduction of a new product by the
rival decreases the financial market value of the firm,
whereas a new filed trademark increases it. A firm’s
own product releases and filed trademarks have pos-
itive and significant coefficients. This is in line with
most of the existing literature (Bayus et al. 2003, Rao
et al. 2004, Srinivasan et al. 2009). The Fama and
French’s (1992) indices show also the expected signs,
positive for the small versus big capitalization index,
negative for the high versus low book/price ratio
index, and positive for the beta index.
To appreciate the monetary magnitude of the
effects, we use the three-day window estimates to
compute U.S. dollars changes in firm market capi-
talization because of an event. See that Table 1b’s
effects are sizable (in absolute terms), although small
in terms of total market capitalization of the two
firms.
4.3. A Tobin’s q Analysis
Our aim here is to further corroborate the findings
from the event study approach. Tobin’s q analysis
is the most widely used approach to estimate the
value of intangible assets (especially in the form of
patents) from the estimation of the market value
equation (Hall et al. 2005, McGahan and Silverman
2006, Ceccagnoli 2008). Tobin’s q is a forward-looking
measure providing market-based views of investor
expectations of the firm’s future profit potential. In
marketing studies, Simon and Sullivan (1993) use
Tobin’s q to measure brand equity, and Rao et al.
(2004) investigate the relationship between manifest
branding strategy and the intangible value of a cor-
poration through a Tobin’s q equation. We take data
of Coca-Cola and Pepsi on a monthly basis during the
period January 1999–December 2003. We have there-
fore 60 observations per firm, and 120 observations
in total. We choose a monthly interval because it is
the smallest interval available to produce still reliable
enough econometric results in the form of a Tobin’s q
regression.8
Tobin’s q is defined as the firm’s financial mar-
ket value per dollar of replacement costs of tangible
assets. Firm financial market value equals outstand-
ing shares times share price plus book value of long-
term debt and net current liabilities. On a monthly
scale, we take both the monthly average of the
daily closing share prices and that of the outstand-
ing shares. Replacement cost of tangible assets is the
8 A quarter regression produces qualitatively similar results.
sum of book value of inventory and net value of
physical plant and equipment. We follow McGahan
(1999) to calculate it. Data are from the U.S. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. Because
accounting data change every four months only, we
use linear interpolation to assign a change to each
month. Although this might sound like a limitation,
one needs to keep in mind that more than 90% of the
variability of Tobin’s q is because of the variability of
the numerator, not the denominator.
We run a Tobin’s q regression in which we use
as core covariates the number of rival new prod-
uct announcements (Productrival) and that of rival
filed trademarks (Trademarkrival). As controls, we
include first both the number of a firm’s new product
announcements (Productfirm) and that of its filed
trademarks (Trademarkfirm).9 Second, we introduce
the same controls as in Rao et al. (2004). Precisely,
we insert three measures obtained from SEC filing
financial accounts: Operating Margin (net income
divided by sales), Leverage (long-term debt divided
by total assets), and Sales Growth (compounded
monthly sales growth rate over the previous three
months). Third, we control for the monetary efforts
in advertising and R&D by using, respectively, the
ratio between advertising expenditures and sales
(Advertising Intensity), and that between R&D
expenditures and sales (R&D Intensity). Forth, we
introduce a dummy firm (Dummy Firm) that takes
the value of one for Pepsi and zero for Coca-Cola.
Fifth, to account for the effect of competition by other
firms, including private labels, we use the Herfindahl
index (Industry Concentration) over firms’ mar-
ket shares in the CSD industry (data from Beverage
Digest, http://www.beverage-digest.com). Finally, to
control for a firm’s activity in other businesses, we
add the number of product announcements in non-
CSD markets (Otherproduct). These product intro-
ductions are also taken from Infotrac’s Promt. When
data are not available on a monthly scale, we use lin-
ear interpolation to simulate them.10
9 It is possible that both product introductions and trademark fil-
ings follow a common strategy that also encompasses a firm’s
response to the moves of its rival. This might suggest the pres-
ence of endogeneity in our core independent variables. To tackle
this problem, we resort to instrumental variable techniques. Specif-
ically, we use as instruments for the number of product announce-
ments and new trademarks the lagged variables (one-month lag)
of Coca-Cola and Pepsi’s product announcements and new trade-
marks. Results, available from the authors upon request, remain
qualitatively unchanged.
10 We run several robustness checks. We introduce as a covari-
ate a time trend to see whether our results are guided by some
unobserved linear trend in the dependent variable for the sample
period. We introduce a multiplicative term (insignificant) among
our core variables. We include the one month lag Tobin’s q to
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Table 2 Robust OLS Estimation of the Tobin’s q Equation
Variable Mean Std. dev. Model 1 Model 2
Productrival 1325 1572 −1607∗∗
0253	
Trademarkrival 2675 4203 0576∗∗
0179	
Productfirm 1325 1572 0780∗
0436	
Trademarkfirm 2675 4203 3244∗∗
0455	
Controls
Operating Margin 0408 0144 −3425 0439
2377	 0717	
Leverage 01639 0091 −1680∗∗ −0009
0435	 0179	
Sales Growth −0030 0247 1734∗∗ −0046
0863	 0256	
Advertising Intensity 0170 0026 3694 1260∗
3636	 0722	
R&D Intensity 0096 0019 6493∗∗ 1247
2825	 1265	
Industry Concentration 0164 0001 −5568 −1921
30054	 10511	
Dummy Firm 0500 0550 3481∗ 0581
1976	 0662	
Otherproducts 1144 0946 −0440 −0018
0359	 0151	
Constant 0432 2579
56733	 19809	
Observations 120 120
R2 033 091
Adj. R2 030 090
Notes. Robust Huber-White estimator of variance. Log-scale regression.
∗0.1 significance; ∗∗0.05 significance.
Table 2 shows that the main findings from the event
study are confirmed. Indeed, Productrival has a
negative effect on a firm’s Tobin’s q, whereas Trade-
markrival has a positive and significant effect. As
above, Productfirm and Trademarkfirm show pos-
itive and significant coefficients. Most of the control
variables have the expected signs, however, they are
barely significant when we introduce the product and
trademark covariates.
An alternative approach to understand the be-
haviour of financial markets is to look at the mar-
ket response to unanticipated changes. To this end,
we follow Mizik and Jacobson (2003) to operational-
ize deviations of the series from what could have
been predicted on the basis of past information as
the residual of an autoregressive model of lag 1. We
use the Poisson model for our count variables (prod-
uct announcements and trademarks) and a standard
avoid unit root bias in our estimates. Results hold qualitatively
unchanged. Findings are weaker, but still with the expected signs,
when we pool together CSD and non-CSD product announcements
and trademarks.
OLS for return on assets. The dependent variable is
the cumulative abnormal returns of firm i in period t.
Results (available from the authors upon request)
are weakly confirmed for rival product announce-
ments and for the own effect of filed trademarks,
but coefficients are not statistically significant for the
other core variables. Interesting enough, when we
look at the time series of product announcements and
trademarks we cannot find evidence of any strong
autocorrelation. This would explain the insignificant
coefficients and would suggest that these events are
difficult to predict from previous period behaviours.
The high nonlinearity of the Poisson model also
makes this estimation less reliable compared to the
event study and the Tobin’s q regression.
4.4. Market Share and Market Size Dynamics
As a final step, we investigate how the variables of
theoretical interest affect the distribution of market
shares and total demand, and, in turn, how these lat-
ter relate to a firm’s Tobin’s q. To this end, we pro-
pose the following generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimation:



lnvi t	= 0+1 lnDt	+2 lnSi t	+ +i t
Dt = 0+1 lnTRivalt	+2 lnTFirmt	
+3 lnPRivalt	+4 lnPFirmt	+ + i t
Si t =0+1 lnPRivalt	+2 lnPFirmt	
+3 lnTRivalt	+4 lnTFirmt	++ i t
(2)
where subscript i = j stands for Coca-Cola or Pepsi.
The first equation relates the Tobin’s q (vi t	 with the
total demand for CSD at period t (Dt	 and firm i’s
market share in period t (Si t) along with controls ().
This equation is inefficient because Dt and Si t are
endogenous variables that produce heteroscedastic
residuals. Thus the GMM first estimates Dt and Si t
using as core instruments new product announce-
ments and new filed trademarks of firm i and its
rival j . A GMM estimation is well suited because it
controls for potential correlation across residuals and
for possible heteroscedasticity.
Total demand Dt and firm i’s market share Si t are
obtained from Beverage Digest (http://www.beverage-
digest.com), which publishes the annual number of
192-ounce cases sold by each firm in the market (one
case equals 1.5 gallons). We use linear interpolation to
insert monthly data, obtaining our proxy for Dt and
for Si t . As exogenous control variables, we employ
the same controls of the Tobin’s q estimation in §4.3.11
11 We do not include Operating Margin and Sales Growth
because they are highly correlated with total demand and market
share. However, including these controls does not change the coef-
ficients of our core variables.
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Table 3 GMM Regression, Tobin’s q Estimation of Equation (2)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Mean Std. dev. Y = vi t
vi t 3880 2720
Demandt 631200 6302 11766∗∗ 12834∗∗ 12753∗∗
2735	 4255	 4714	
MarketSharei t 0501 0083 4322∗∗ 3242∗∗ 4154∗∗
1254	 0154	 1656	
Controls
Advertising Intensity 0170 0026 0769∗∗ 0494∗ 0329
0205	 0262	 0291	
R&D Intensity 0096 0019 0432 0586 0413
0358	 0544	 0462	
Leverage 0163 0091 −0142∗∗ −0203∗∗ −0213∗∗
0014	 0013	 0007	
Industry Concentration 0164 0001 −0043 −0085 −0066
0453	 0197	 0445	
Otherproducti t 1144 0946 0133 0216 0317
0903	 0383	 0476	
Constant — — 9843∗∗ 8744∗∗ 9422∗∗
3124	 1301	 4633	
Y = Si t
Productrival 1325 1572 −0031∗∗ −0061∗∗
0005	 0011	
Trademarkrival 2675 4203 0726
0655	
Productfirm 1325 1572 0085∗∗ 0049∗∗
0004	 0006	
Trademarkfirm 2675 4203 0614
0752	
Constant — — 0133∗∗ 0229∗∗
0048	 0013	
Y = Dt
Productrival 1325 1572 1455
0953	
Trademarkrival 2675 4203 0222∗∗ 0015∗∗
0003	 0004	
Productfirm 1325 1572 1223
1547	
Trademarkfirm 2675 4203 1783∗∗ 0064∗∗
0173	 0003	
Constant — — 2126∗∗ 1751∗∗
0640	 0256	
Exogenous controls Inserted always
Adj. R2 0855 0743 0898
Observations 120 120 120
Notes. Robust Huber-White estimator of variance. Log-scale regression.
∗0.1 significance; ∗∗0.05 significance.
Main descriptive statistics and results of Equation (2)
are reported in Table 3. The scale is logarithmic.
To correctly identify the instruments, we run
first the market share equation (Model 1), then the
demand equation (Model 2), and finally we show the
correctly identified estimation (Model 3). Most impor-
tantly, from the instrumental regressions, we can sort
out how product innovation and new advertising
affect a firm’s financial market value. Notice that
firm i’s market share Si t does not depend on new
filed trademarks of either firm i or firm j (Model 1
in Table 3). Instead, it is directly influenced by both
firms’ product announcements, i.e., Productrival
has a negative effect and Productfirm a positive
effect. By contrast, total demand Dt depends only
on new filed trademarks (Model 2 in Table 3). Both
Trademarkrival and Trademarkfirm increase Dt ,
whereas Productrival and Productfirm do not
have a significant effect. Model 3 in Table 3 presents
the results of the complete estimation, using only the
instruments that show a significant coefficient in the
first stage. Results are totally in line with the find-
ings of the event study and the Tobin’s q regression
(Tables 1a and 2).12
In addition, the GMM estimation shows that prod-
uct innovation and new advertising act through dif-
ferent channels. In a mature product market such as
CSD, new advertising boosts total industry demand
and/or increases entry barriers, so that rival filed
trademarks have a positive spillover on a firm’s finan-
cial market value. Incremental product innovation is a
more aggressive strategic weapon that directly affects
market shares, implying a negative impact on firm i’
financial market value.
5. Conclusion and Discussion
Although there is growing literature attempting to
investigate how different marketing actions affect a
firm’s financial market value (i.e., Bayus et al. 2003,
Pauwels et al. 2004, Srinivasan et al. 2009), very lit-
tle is known about the impact of rivals’ moves. Chen
et al. (2005) find that rivals’ product announcements
have a bigger negative impact on a firm’s financial
market value when product newness is limited. This
is consistent with our finding for the CSD indus-
try where most product innovations are modest or
incremental. We indeed show that when Coca-Cola
(Pepsi) announces a new product, Pepsi (Coca-Cola)’s
market capitalization shrinks by approximately $350
($650) million. On the other hand, to the best of
our knowledge, this is the first study that looks
at the effect of rivals’ new advertising on a firm’s
financial market value. In this respect, our empiri-
cal finding is worth emphasizing. When Coca-Cola
(Pepsi) files a new trademark, Pepsi (Coca-Cola)’s
market capitalization increases by approximately $280
($480) million. We argue that a combination of mar-
ket expansion, increased differentiation, and stronger
entry barriers, because of advertising, might explain
this positive effect.
12 It is worth noting that the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifica-
tion of restrictions is equal to 2.77, with a p-value of 0.302. Therefore
the test does not reject the null hypothesis, ensuring that the group
of instruments is not correlated with the error term.
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Our findings allow us to draw several implications
for investors, managers, and policymakers. Share-
holders who want to assess the performance of strate-
gies proposed by the board of managers should
recognize that financial models that underestimate
the impacts of rival actions could produce biased
forecasts.
To elaborate correct strategies, managers must
disentangle the different impulses that come from
the surrounding environment, especially competitors’
moves. New advertising and incremental product
introductions are two major loci of firm investments,
and thus key areas of managerial decisions. In our
view, managers have to understand not only the
impact of a particular move, but also the chan-
nels through which this move acts. We show that
in the CSD market advertising increases a firm’s
and its rival’s financial market value by increasing
total demand, while new product releases steal mar-
ket share. Therefore, when managers decide how to
divide a firm budget between R&D and advertis-
ing, they must also keep in mind the different lev-
els of future aggressiveness that these investments
imply. Moreover, the correct timing and alternation of
these two moves—adapted also to the observed rival
moves—could significantly influence the firm’s finan-
cial market value.
For marketing managers, one of the most interest-
ing results of this work is the positive spillover effect
of new advertising on competitors’ financial mar-
ket value through an increase of total demand. This
result seems to fit well with the recent trend in the
CSD industry toward a greater similarity of market-
ing approaches among competitors. Several business
press articles (e.g., Devaney 2002) have recognized
that both Pepsi and Coca-Cola seem to have shifted
their marketing strategies from brand consolidation
to more generic advertising. This similarity could be
an explanation for the effect on market size dynamics
that we discover.
Policymakers and antitrust analysts could benefit
from this study by noting that some firm investments
may have a collusive effect. Novel detailed inves-
tigations, particularly on the role of advertising in
oligopolistic mature product markets, could shed new
light on the extent to which promotion is used to
increase entry barriers and to consolidate dominant
positions.
The paper has a number of limitations that we hope
can be addressed in future research. We assumed in
our empirical exercise that the price remains con-
stant during the period under study. Although this
is a fairly reasonable assumption in the CSD market,
controlling for price announcements and price pro-
motions would definitely improve the robustness of
our findings. Although Coca-Cola and Pepsi still rely
heavily on the CSD industry, they have tried to diver-
sify away in other related businesses. Most impor-
tantly, these companies have a large fraction of their
sales from international markets. We try to control as
well as we can for these additional sources of hetero-
geneity in our data. However, non-CSD and interna-
tional markets might need to be addressed separately
because they might involve idiosyncratic marketing
actions and different competitive conditions. Finally,
extending this research to other mature industries
would increase our confidence in the generalizability
of the main findings.
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